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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Across the nation, decision makers have long struggled with the importance 
of protecting the lands that feed us; provide critical habitats; supply recharge 
reservoirs; hold unique cultural and historical significance; buffer our urban, 
suburban, and exurban communities; and offer educational, recreational, and 
spiritual respite and retreat—and the tradeoffs of economic sustainability. The 
diversity of associations about land and its numerous supporting roles provide 
essential links to understanding the breadth of private and social economic, 
health, and environmental values generated by protected land resources. The 
robustness of natural- and social-capital values, increasingly referred to as 
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ecosystem services,1 depends on tactical considerations given to permanent 
protection efforts by the public agencies and private organizations working to 
secure and enhance the condition of the land resource.2 
The ease of application across varied lands coupled with the financial and 
tax-associated benefits of conservation easements have driven the popularity of 
their use in conserving private lands across the United States.3 Conservation 
easements typically require sizeable public funding resources, which are 
provided through either direct public expenditures via diverse public programs 
established to promote the conservation of land or through tax benefits.4 As a 
measure of accountability, land preservation organizations should seek to 
employ maximum net public-benefit criteria that include ecosystem-service 
values, which are incorporated into the setting of landscape-scale-preservation 
goals and the selection of lands for the acquisition of conservation easements. 
There is a second fundamental arena associated with the valuation of 
conservation easements that has historically separated the importance of 
ecosystem services from the market value of land. While conservation 
easements are a legal statement of land stewardship,5 the appraised value of 
conservation easements predominantly reflects development potential.6 As a 
 
 1. The term ecosystem service has been used in a variety of circumstances by resource economists 
to explain the quantifiable services that an ecosystem provides to humans, including consumables and 
nonconsumables. 
Expressed as: 
Ej = r(N) 
Ej = j
th ecosystem service 
N = natural capital 
r = ecosystem function or process 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture, Urban Tree Canopy Assessment: Glossary, U.S. FOREST SERVICE 
NORTHERN RESEARCH STATION, available at http://www.nrs.fs.fed.us/urban/utc/about/glossary/ (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2010), offers a useful context-appropriate definition: 
Ecosystem Services. The benefits that people obtain from ecosystems. These benefits may be 
environmental, social, or economic. Examples of environmental outcomes include the 
protection of streams, reduced stormwater runoff, reduced ozone concentrations, and 
increased carbon sequestration. Social outcomes may include improved human health, buffers 
for wind and noise, increased recreational opportunities, and neighborhood beautification. 
Economic outcomes can include reduced heating and cooling costs and increased property 
values. 
 2. See generally John Loomis et al., Measuring the Total Economic Value of Restoring Ecosystem 
Services in an Impaired River Basin: Results From a Contingent Valuation Survey, 33 ECOLOGICAL 
ECON. 103 (2000). 
 3. See, e.g., Adam E. Draper, Conservation Easements: Now More Than Ever—Overcoming 
Obstacles to Protect Private Land, 34 ENVTL. L. 247, 255–56 (2004). 
 4. Nancy A. McLaughlin, Condemning Conservation Easements: Protecting the Public Interest and 
Investment in Conservation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1897, 1903–04 (2008); see also Amy Wilson Morris, 
Easing Conservation? Conservation Easements, Public Accountability and Neoliberalism, 39 
GEOFORUM 1215 (2008); Amy Wilson Morris & Adena R. Rissman, Public Access to Information on 
Private Land Conservation: Tracking Conservation Easements, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1237 (2010). 
 5. ELIZABETH BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT 
HANDBOOK 100 (2d ed. 2005). 
 6. John B. Wright, Tax Implications of Conservation Easements, REAL EST. REV., Summer 1994, 
at 75. See also JULIE ANN GUSTANSKI, PROTECTING UNIQUE LAND RESOURCES: TOOLS, 
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result, the economic value of an easement as a federal or state income-tax 
deduction or its market value for outright purchase does not always correspond 
with its ecological, scenic, and cultural importance.7 This seeming paradox is 
familiar to easement practitioners. As open land becomes scarce and 
emotionally vital to landowners and adjacent residents, the total cost of an 
easement may soar in relation to the land’s qualifications under the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) criteria of ecological, open-space, historic, and 
recreation value.8 
While conventional appraisal methods, such as market and comparable sales 
approaches, remain the norm for valuing most conservation easements, the 
appropriateness of these methods is increasingly debated. Conservation 
practitioners have long promoted the protection of land and its diverse 
biophysical resources as providing an array of environmental, social, and 
ecological benefits to the broader community. Such benefits extend beyond a 
landowner’s tax benefits for a full or partial donation of a conservation 
easement or the remuneration to a landowner in the instance of the purchase of 
such rights by a governmental agency or nonprofit organization. However, 
notwithstanding the fundamental benefits of these services, the public and 
private sector have been slow to integrate them in any formal way into either 
conservation easement valuation or decision-making processes. This draws 
attention to the historically ill-defined delineation of ecosystem-service flows, 
which could be very helpful to decision makers.9 Progress, however, has been 
made over recent years in economics, social sciences, and biophysical sciences 
to include such service values for the public benefits provided by protected 
private lands into the strategic conservation planning framework.10 The 
incorporation of some unit of measure for ecosystem services will aid in driving 
toward maximizing the net benefit of dollars expended for land conservation 
(whether by public agencies or by land trusts). Net benefit is maximized at the 
point at which marginal benefit equals marginal cost. Thus, in so doing, 
 
TECHNIQUES AND TAX ADVANTAGES FOR PENNSYLVANIA LANDOWNERS (1997); LAND TRUST 
ALLIANCE & NAT’L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRES., APPRAISING EASEMENTS: GUIDELINES FOR 
VALUATION OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND LAND CONSERVATION EASEMENTS (3d ed. 1999); 
Roderick H. Squires, Introduction to Legal Analysis, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION 
EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 69 (Julie Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000). 
 7. JULIE ANN GUSTANSKI, CONSERVATION INSTRUMENTS: INTERGENERATIONAL ISSUES, 
ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (2007). See also TIMOTHY C. LINDSTROM, A TAX GUIDE TO 
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS (2008). 
 8. See I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(a) (2006). 
 9. See GEOFFREY HEAL, NATURE AND THE MARKETPLACE: CAPTURING THE VALUE OF 
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (2000); Patricia Balvanera et al., Conserving Biodiversity And Ecosystem 
Services, 291 SCIENCE 2047 (2001). 
 10. E.g., David M. Olson & Eric Dinerstein, The Global 200: A Representation Approach To 
Conserving The Earth’s Most Biologically Valuable Ecoregions, 12 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 502, 502 
(1998). See also CRAIG R. GROVES, DRAFTING A CONSERVATION BLUEPRINT: A PRACTITIONER'S 
GUIDE TO PLANNING FOR BIODIVERSITY (2003). 
5 GUSTANSKI & WRIGHT_PAGINATED&WRIGHT 10/6/2011  
112 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 74:109 
appropriate signals to local and regional land markets will encourage the 
provision of optimal levels of desired public amenities.11 
Conservation easements and other techniques of “land saving” typically 
occur where there is significant “land losing,” and the resulting implementation 
costs largely reflect market forces for development and not the land’s 
qualitative importance.12 While rising subdivision values make donated 
easements more attractive from an income-tax deduction standpoint, this too 
often tempts landowners into selling the land for development. Escalating 
values also increase the cost of purchased easements—that is, purchase of 
development rights (PDRs)—and can make them unattainable for land trusts or 
public agencies.13 
Generally, there are two perspectives on identifying the benefits and costs of 
conservation efforts. The first focuses on the potential biophysical benefits and 
costs. The second focuses on the socioeconomic benefits and costs.14 The 
socioeconomic perspective provides a time dimension to benefit–cost analysis. 
Associated valuation processes use similar data, but in quite different ways. As 
shown in Figure 1, the socioeconomic benefits and costs depend on the 
biophysical benefits and costs, and the biophysical benefits and costs are 
predicated on socioeconomic behavioral responses. Ultimately, the outcome is 
dependent on conservation strategies employed on the subject lands. 
 
 11. Rigoberto A. Lopez et al., Amenity Benefits and the Optimal Allocation of Land, 70 LAND 
ECON. 53 (1994). 
 12. STEPHEN SMALL, PRESERVING FAMILY LANDS BOOK III: NEW TAX RULES AND STRATEGIES 
AND CHECK LIST 29–39, (2002). 
 13. Thomas L. Daniels, The Purchase of Development Rights: Preserving Agricultural Land and 
Open Space, 57 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 421 (1991). 
 14. See Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Potential Ecosystem Services Associated with Protected Lands 
Maximizing the net value of conservation easements as a strategic tool 
within a multilayered framework designed to assure protected landscapes—
whether at the local, regional, or eco-regional plane—requires examination of a 
multiplicity of interactions across the public–private interface. Actively 
cultivating the movement from mere discussion to the widespread use of 
conservation easements aimed at net value maximization requires a general 
shift in public and private program operations. Most crucially, land preservation 
goal setting must move toward landscape-scale targets that require coordinated 
planning, concerted effort to identify and bridge gaps, and the willingness to 
build strategic alliances. This includes working closely with landowners whose 
private interests are often closely aligned with society’s interest in protecting 
productive lands, open space, habitat, and species.15 To this point, there are 
numerous instances across the nation where private landowners have driven 
various land-saving actions. From leading state farmland conservation programs 
in Pennsylvania, to initiatives to protect and manage forest lands in 
Massachusetts, to efforts such as the Chama Peak Landowner Alliance 
addressing land-management and conservation issues across more than one 
million acres of the San Juan to Rio Grande landscape, private landowners have 
taken strides to maintain and manage their lands in ways that provide 
significant public benefit.16 
 
 15. See Ray Vaughn, Environmentalists and Forest Landowners: Why We Must Work Together, 3 
VT. J. ENVTL. L. 77 (2001–02). See also WILDLIFE HABITAT POLICY RESEARCH PROGRAM, OUR 
NATION’S WILDLIFE HABITATS: COMPLETING AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM FOR CONSERVING THEIR 
VALUES AND BENEFITS IN A CHANGING WORLD (2010). 
 16. Hal Marcovitz, Hallowell Favors Bill To Keep Development Off Farmland, THE MORNING 
CALL, June 15, 1985, at B3; Keystone Cooperator Profile: Forest Land Owners United, THE MASS. 
KEYSTONE PROJECT (2009), available at http://masskeystone.net/stories/eve/index.html; Press Release, 
W. Envtl. Law Ctr., Landowners Partner Together to Protect the San Juan to Rio Grande Landscape: 
New “Chama Peak Landowner Alliance” Launched Oct. 18, 2010, available at http:// 
www.westernlaw.org/article/landowners-partner-together-protect-san-juan-rio-grande-landscape. 
Proposed Conservation Area 
Protected through Easement 
(Biophysical) 
 Increased ecosystem health 
 Improved habitat / contiguity 
(endangered species) 
 Improved water quality & quantity 
 Biodiversity enhancement 
 Biological control/stability 
 Refugia for migrating species 
 Erosion control 
 Nutrient cycling 
 Improved night sky conditions 
Benefits to Community and Region 
Beyond Conservation Area 
(Socio-economic) 
 Human health  
 Climate regulation / carbon 
sequestration 
 Flood and storm damage control 
 Pollution absorption (air and water) 
 Agricultural and Ecosystem products  
 Spiritual, educational, historic, 
cultural, aesthetic 
 Recreation (use and non-use) 
 Light pollution reduction 
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Part III of this article sets forth possibilities by which certain market-based 
incentives—aligned with conservation easements—may act to facilitate efficient 
regional investments in conservation. In Part IV, attention is turned to the 
question of “what to protect?” This question leads to the presentation of a 
simple model that enables alternative market-based solutions that may be 
developed for coupling with the use of conservation easements to provide 
appropriate market signals to landowners within identified specific conservation 
planning areas, thereby optimizing net value. Part V sets forth models under 
which the issue of information asymmetry is examined in the context of 
maximizing net efficiency of public and private conservation easement program 
investments. Resolving the matter of asymmetric information flow is 
fundamental to maximizing the net value of land conservation-easement 
programs. In Part VI, subparts A–C, case studies are used to explore the 
arguments of preceding sections and the efficacy of conservation easements at 
different landscape scales and in the direction of net value maximization. These 
case studies explore how conservation easements are being created along a 
gradient of development pressures in the changing American West.17 
II 
THE POTENTIAL FOR MARKET-BASED SOLUTIONS IN THE INCENTIVE-BASED 
CONSERVATION EASEMENT MARKETPLACE 
It is well established that markets allocate pure private goods and services 
most efficiently.18 The parallel circumstance for effective public management of 
resources is also clear: governments distribute pure public goods and services 
most efficiently. But what of the quasi-public goods—private goods with public-
good aspects—that are provided by conservation easements? From an 
economist’s perspective, inefficiencies created under such conditions should 
provide an opportunity to create better institutional market-like arrangements.19 
As an incentive-based mechanism, conservation easements themselves seek to 
address market failings.20 Yet, despite much success, substantial issues 
surrounding the implementation of land preservation remain. Central to this is 
 
 17. See generally STEPHEN TRIMBLE, BARGAINING FOR EDEN: THE FIGHT FOR THE LAST OPEN 
SPACES IN AMERICA, (2008); JOHN B. WRIGHT, ROCKY MOUNTAIN DIVIDE: SELLING AND SAVING 
THE WEST (1993). 
 18. Elinor Ostrom, Challenges and Growth: The Development of the Interdisciplinary Field of 
Institutional Analysis, 3 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 239, 256 (2007). 
 19. Kenneth Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 345 (Summer 1972). See also 
BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 41 (1988). 
 20. Market failure, in context, means that market forces in the land market do not work to fully 
reflect social values and thus fail to secure the desired balance between land conversion and land 
conservation. See, e.g., RALPH E. HEIMLICH & WILLIAM D. ANDERSON, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., AGRIC. 
ECON. REPORT NO. 803, DEVELOPMENT AT THE URBAN FRINGE AND BEYOND: IMPACTS ON 
AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL LAND 3–4 (2001) (explaining that “[c]ontinued demand for low-density 
development despite negative consequences for residents can be understood as a market failure” and 
“[b]ecause there are no markets for some characteristics of land, such as scenic amenity, there are no 
observable prices apart from the land’s value for development”). 
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the fact that most public and private conservation-easement programs have 
been, and remain, persistently underfunded. Further complicating the 
conservation-easement market, recent years have brought several notable IRS 
challenges to appraisal practices.21 
Despite these challenges, and the ever widening wealth divide in the United 
States, recent expansions of the federal tax code that allow easement write offs 
for up to sixteen years allow many private landowners to use all or most of the 
potential tax benefits associated with the donation or partial donation of a 
conservation easement on their land.22 If optimal conservation remains society’s 
objective, it is vital to build upon the existing body of mechanisms to bridge the 
compensation gap, thereby removing the full burden of social responsibility and 
personal financial loss associated with the positive externality borne by private 
landowners whose lands provide essential public benefits. 
Typically, the greatest driver in conservation is the cost of the “no action 
alternative,” or “the cost of doing nothing.” Associated benefits including those 
produced through the conservation of historically and culturally important, 
open space, recreational, wildlife habitat, and working lands are also drivers. 
Economists have long exalted the merits of market-based or incentive-centered 
approaches to safeguarding the environment. About ninety years ago, A. C. 
Pigou suggested corrective taxes to discourage actions that produce 
externalities.23 And, some forty years ago, John Dales first proposed 
transferable property rights as a policy instrument to promote environmental 
protection at substantially lower total cost than conventional methods.24 Within 
the context of land conservation, market-based tools on their own may be 
marginally effective, but, in recent years, they have been gaining popularity as 
important additions to comprehensive conservation strategies.25 Market-based 
 
 21. COLORADO COALITION OF LAND TRUSTS, FACT SHEET: IRS AUDITS OF CONSERVATION 
EASEMENTS IN COLORADO (2008), available at http://www.cclt.org/Downloads/policy/ 
irs/IRSfactsheetmay08.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2010). These issues were covered in a series of stories in 
The Washington Post. The worst abuser was the “conservation buyer” program run by TNC. The 
organization would purchase land, place a conservation easement, and then re-sell it at substantially 
reduced prices, and often to supporters and trustees. Joe Stephens & David Ottaway, Nature 
Conservancy Suspends Land Sales, WASH. POST, May 13, 2003, at A3. 
 22. This enhanced incentive, created in the 2006 Pension Protection Act, § 1206, I.R.C. § 170(b) 
(amended 2010), was extended through 2009 through the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-234, § 15302, 122 Stat. 1501, 2263 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 170(b) (LexisNexis 
2011)). Extension of the enhanced incentive was again granted through 2011 in the Tax Relief, 
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010. Pub. L No.111-312, § 723, 
124 Stat. 3296, 3316 (codified at I.R.C. § 170(b) (LexisNexis 2011)). 
 23. See ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1st ed. 1920). 
 24. JOHN H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES: AN ESSAY IN POLICY-MAKING AND 
ECONOMICS (1968). 
 25. See, e.g., STEFANO PAGIOLA ET AL., SELLING FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES: 
MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS FOR CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT (2002). See also 
BARTHOLOMEW MCGUIRE MARTIN, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, BUYING, SELLING, AND TRADING 
BIODIVERSITY IN WASHINGTON: A BAZAAR FOR BIODIVERSITY (2007), available at http:// 
www.defenders.org/resources/publications/programs_and_policy/biodiversity_partners/buying,_ 
5 GUSTANSKI & WRIGHT_PAGINATED&WRIGHT 10/6/2011  
116 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 74:109 
strategies make it possible to both identify and allocate economic value to the 
ecosystem services produced from the protection of lands and their innate 
resources at the appropriate scale. 26 
Development of an ecosystem-services marketplace linked to conservation 
easements and integrated conservation strategies will require the creation and 
advancement of tools that will ensure measurable benefits, protocols for 
assigning and tracking units,27 and broad accessibility to public and private 
agencies. The marketplace must be (1) credible and transparent, 
(2) systematically effective, (3) low in transaction costs, (4) able to deal with 
multiple values, and (5) able to involve strategic investment at the landscape 
scale. 
There are numerous possible opportunities for the development of new, or 
the extension of existing, market-based initiatives that may lead to better 
alignment of public and private land-conservation initiatives and move toward 
an optimal provision of public benefits. While not intended to be exhaustive, 
Table 1 identifies several market-based incentives, some of which are in practice 
today. All of these incentives have room for evaluation, expansion, and 
adaptation. Broadly, these incentive structures include financial assistance, 
regulatory aid or relief, technical and educational support, recognition, and 
other market-based incentives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
selling_and_trading_biodiversity_in_washington.pdf; Kenneth Iain MacDonald, New Partners: 
Institutional Dynamics, Ideological Shifts and Market Logics in the Organization of Biodiversity 
Conservation, Presentation at the 24th Annual Meeting of the Society for Conservation Biology, 
Conservation for a Changing Planet (July 4, 2010). 
 26. Rodrigo Arriagada & Charles Perrings, Making Payments for Ecosystem Services Work 21–23 
(U.N. Envtl. Programme, ecoSERVICES Grp., Working Paper 2009), available at http:// 
www.ecoservices.asu.edu/pdf/UNEP%20Working%20Paper%201.pdf. 
 27. Here, the term “unit” refers to a standard accepted unit of measure for diverse ecosystem 
service contributions of protected lands to human welfare. Such units provide a universal framework 
for use by public agencies, land trusts, and ecosystem-service markets. 
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Table 1: Market-based Conservation Incentives Summary 
 
Incentive Structure Example Operation
Financial Instruments
• Real estate transfer taxes • Taxes from sales funds conservation
• Investment fund for financing stewardship 
projects
• Competitive grants or low interest loans
• Land conservation trust fund • Public and private funds pooled and privately managed 
for conservation easement acquisitions or ecosystem 
service gap funding
• Voluntary tax-deferred account established at 
time conservation easement is placed
• Account stays with the land from one 
generation/owner to the next; funds only available for 
approved stewardship purposes.
• Ecosystem services investment fund • Direct private sector payments for ecosystem 
services, in which the private sector defines and 
purchases benefits (e.g. private social investment 
pooled fund, competitive grants, etc.)
• Property tax credits for managing lands under 
Endangered Species Act
• Federal tax credit (to help offset local property taxes) 
if land is managed for species conservation
• Impact Fees / Tax penalties for habitat 
conversion
• Per acre tax or development impact fee charged for 
habitat conversion in priority areas
Technical and Educational Support
• Technical assistance shop / one-stop shop • Could be NGO, quasi-public or public 
multidisciplinary team to assist land owners
• Create commodity commissions • Provide scientific, economic, technical assistance to 
landowners to aid in implementation of sustainability 
practices.
• Stewardship Exchange Programs • Protect riparian areas on private land in exchange for 
forage on public land.
• Working Lands Legacy Programs • Match owners of working lands with next generation, 
provide training and transition planning, etc. with tax 
credits to participants in line with certain requirements
Norm-based (Motivational)
• Recognition /Award Programs • Provide plaques, certificate or other recognition. 
Emphasize positive, build relationships between 
government and landowners.
• Green Certification Programs / Market-based 
environmental standards and certifications
• Certify products raised under Best Managemetn 
Practices (BMPs); value added for products and 
services (e.g. Smart Wood, Salmon-safe food, etc.)
• Heritage Stocks designation • Signage, recognition events to recognize landowners 
who manage lands for healthy stocks (e.g., salmon)
Regulatory Aid / Relief
• Conservation tax credits •  State income tax credit for easements
• Eliminate regulatory disincentives for 
voluntary exotic removal and habitat 
h t
• Expedited permit or waiver process
• Pre-listing conservation agreement • Conservation real estate brokerage
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As with any new land initiative, there will be complexities to resolve in 
developing the most pragmatic tools to aid in the alignment of incentives to 
induce optimal land-saving actions. Yet, with all the work to protect lands, 
organizations and government agencies must work together to rethink and 
realign with the goal of net benefit maximization across the gradient—from the 
urban–suburban fringe to exurban, rural, and remote lands. With primary 
criticisms of reform squarely centered on issues linked to costs to the public 
coffers and related inefficiencies,28 exploration of the marketplace appears 
appropriate. Advancing markets is about taking risks. With the vast demands 
on governments to address fundamental social policy issues such as health care, 
education, and unemployment, improvements in the use of markets to devise 
sustainable and self-sufficient programs are necessary. Creating market-like 
arrangements that will aid in moving public and private efforts to sharing—and 
executing—a vision aimed at the landscape scale will require much work and 
the maintenance of an entrepreneurial spirit. 
III 
WHAT TO PROTECT? 
A new approach to developing market-based mechanisms can more fully 
articulate the value of those lands protected by conservation easements. The 
age-old question of “what to protect” will, however, assuredly remain. Efforts 
to protect farm, forest, wild, and open-space lands have often been played out 
as win–lose scenarios, in which conservation is pitted against economic 
opportunity. Even in the face of a retracting economy, our nation’s lands 
continue to face development pressure.29 The challenge to public and private 
resource managers and decision makers is deciding what lands are valuable and 
how best to protect them. A 2001 survey of state farmland preservation 
programs made broad assumptions about nation-wide efforts.30 In general, 
programs protect both productive lands and ecosystem services. All things 
being equal, the level of agency-based land protection is correlated with 
population density; more protection for a state like New Jersey and less 
protection for a state like Wyoming. Productive lands with high values tend to 
 
 28. Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development And Natural Beauty: The Promise and Dilemma of 
Conservation Easements, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 119, 135 (2010). 
 29. See, e.g., SUSAN M. STEIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOREST SERV., PAC. NW. RESEARCH 
STATION, GEN. TECHNICAL REPORT PNW-GTR-795, PRIVATE FORESTS, PUBLIC BENEFITS: 
INCREASED HOUSING DENSITY AND OTHER PRESSURES ON PRIVATE FOREST CONTRIBUTIONS 
(2009). See also New Jersey Gains Farms Despite Losing Farmland, Farm and Food News Update 
11/19/10, AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST (Nov. 19, 2010), available at http://blog. 
farmland.org/2010/11/farm-and-food-news-update-111910; April Rees, USFS Report: ‘Ecosystem 
Services’ at Risk From Suburban Development, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/08/19/19greenwire-usfs-report-ecosystem-services-at-risk-from-sub-
6173.html. 
 30. Daniel Hellerstein & Cynthia Nickerson, Farmland Protection Programs: What Does the Public 
Want?, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, May 2002, at 27. 
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be given more protection with an emphasis on viable operations. However, 
farmland-preservation programs alone may not fulfill the range of amenity-
conservation preferences of the general public. 
The results of a national survey concerning open space and land-
conservation attitudes indicate preferences for protecting the habitat of 
threatened species, public access to recreation, and greater safeguards for open 
space.31 Another study that assessed preferences for a different bundle of 
features connected with lands protected through farmland and open-space 
preservation programs found that respondents most interested in the 
environmental attributes associated with preserving farmland were primarily 
concerned with protecting groundwater quality, wildlife habitat, and natural 
places.32 Respondents who indicated that land preservation actions should be 
aesthetically guided had a stronger than average preference for public access.33 
These results reveal varied preferences for the conservation of lands and open-
space amenities across the nation. In turn, the variety of preferences can be 
translated into different levels of willingness to pay (WTP) or valuation of 
ecosystem services. In other words, maximizing public benefits from land 
preservation will mean different strategies in different parts of the nation. 
In the following section a conceptual model that integrates a traditional 
conservation–easement-appraisal framework with ecosystem-service values is 
developed to evaluate one possibility for an incentive-based framework to 
signal net value maximization for public and private conservation-easement 
programs and optimal conservation of key lands. 
IV 
A POTENTIAL PLATFORM TO ENHANCE THE EFFICIENCY OF CONSERVATION-
EASEMENT PROGRAM INVESTMENTS AT THE REGIONAL SCALE 
The model outlined presents a way to encourage efficient regional 
investments in conservation easements and strategic landscape-scale 
conservation efforts by incorporating ecosystem-service values.34 It examines the 
situation in which asymmetric information exists between the public agencies 
and private organizations and landowners in the conservation-easement 
 
 31. Julie Ann Gustanski et al., The Ethics-Economics-Policy Paradigm: The Foundation for An 
Integrated Land Trust Conservation Decision-Support Model, 3 URB. ECOSYSTEMS 83 (1999). 
 32. Jeffrey Kline & Dennis Wichelns, Measuring Heterogeneous Preferences For Preserving 
Farmland And Open Space, 26 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 211 (1998). 
 33. Id. at 214–15. 
 34. See Julie A. Gustanski, Land Trusts and Conservation Decision-Making: The Integrated Land 
Conservation Decision-Support Model, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 453 (Julie Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000); JULIE ANN 
GUSTANSKI & THOMAS L. DANIELS, UGA DECISION-SUPPORT MODEL & ECONOMIC IMPACT 
ANALYSIS FOR THE NORTHERN LIMITS OF THE ALDERTON-MCMILLIN COMMUNITY PLANNING 
AREA (2006). 
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marketplace.35 When either side of the market lacks information required to 
make decisions or to take specific actions (such as price, risk, site specific 
amenities, et cetera), efficiency is sacrificed.36 Findings from work on water 
rights, carbon offsets, and similar ecosystem-services markets indicate that 
information asymmetry thwarts optimum market success.37 Conservation-
easement practitioners and public-program administrators know well the 
problems of asymmetric information in the subject marketplace.38 While land 
trust program managers, for example, may have greater familiarity and 
information pertaining to conservation-easement values, landowners have 
superior information about the unique features of their land. Even where 
collective conservation strategies exist to protect multiple parcel blocks of land, 
each conservation-easement transaction is unique—negotiated on a case-by-
case basis in a market that provides parties only modest help. 
A. Framework 
Suppose development choice is not dichotomous: a landowner can choose to 
develop no land, all of her land, or some amount in between. Also, assume 
there are two landowners with identical size and quality of acres represented by 
â. Each acre can be developed or protected, and the total number of acres 
protected is ai, i = 1, 2. If a landowner chooses to develop land, she will receive a 
payment equal to b per acre, which is the same for both landowners. Social 
benefit is also derived for those lands that remain in their agricultural, cultural, 
or natural state. Marginal benefit MB (a) represents the social benefit per acre 
of protected land, ai. The per-acre MB of conserved land is assumed to 
negatively slope to reflect the belief that while each acre of preserved land 
yields positive benefits to society, each additional acre beyond the optimal of 
protected acres provides less incremental benefit than the previous acre. If the 
 
 35. See generally Christopher S. Elmendorf, Securing Ecological Investments on Other People’s 
Land: A Transaction-Costs Perspective, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 529 (2004). 
 36. See generally Stephen Polasky, Investment, Information, Collection, and Endangered Species 
Conservation on Private Land, in PROTECTING ENDANGERED SPECIES IN THE UNITED STATES: 
BIOLOGICAL NEEDS, POLITICAL REALITIES, ECONOMIC CHOICES, 317–20 (Jason F. Shogren & John 
Tschirhart eds., 2001); Tracy R. Lewis, Protecting the Environment When Costs and Benefits are 
Privately Known, 27 RAND. J. ECON. 819 (1996). 
 37. Stuart Whitten et al., Putting Theory into Practice: Market Failure and Market Based Instrument 
(CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems, Socio-Econ. & Env’t in Discussion Working Paper Series 2007-02, 
2007), available at http://www.csiro.au/files/files/pf3h.pdf. See also Antony Dnes & Dean Lueck, 
Asymmetric Information and the Law of Servitudes Governing Land, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 89 (2009); 
Gary Stoneham, Creating Markets for Environmental Goods and Services: A Mechanism Design 
Approach (Land & Water Austl., Soc. & Institutional Research Program, Research Project No. DSE3, 
2007). 
 38. E.g., Paul J. Ferraro, Asymmetric Information and Contract Design for Payments for 
Environmental Services, 65 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 810 (2008); JULIE ANN GUSTANSKI, WASH. WATER 
TRUST, CONJOINING VALUATION METHODS: MODELING THE RIGHT PRICE FOR WATER RIGHTS 
(2003); Dnes & Lueck, supra note 37. See generally Paul J. Ferraro, Asymmetric Information and 
Contract Design for Payments for Environmental Services, 65 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 810 (2008) 
(discussing the asymmetric information between landowners and conservation agents that limits the 
economic efficiency, and thus the effectiveness of conservation programs). 
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social benefit of protected land per acre exceeds the private per-acre value of 
developed land, then the public or private entity seeking to maximize the net 
welfare may choose to offer payment of pi, i = 1, 2 dollar per acre to protect the 
land. The landowner will request the value of land in its developed state, b. Yet, 
the landowner receives benefit by retaining ownership and remaining on the 
land; therefore, there is a level of compensation for conservation less than b in 
which the landowner receives the same benefit as with the development option 
and zero compensation for protecting the land. 
All landowners are not homogeneous; therefore, their varying preferences 
must be addressed. For example, some will attain a higher level of satisfaction 
from protecting their land than others. Those with strong land-conservation 
preferences are likely to make different choices than landowners with weak 
preferences for preservation, even when the two may face equal development 
opportunities and constraints. Therefore, a landowner’s preferences for 
development must be considered to determine the landowner’s choice. Let 
MWTAi, i=1, 2, represent the minimum per-acre payment a landowner is 
willing to accept (MWTA) to conserve land. Normally, the condition price 
increases with each acre conserved. While both landowners prefer more 
protection to less protection, each additional acre of protected land provides 
less satisfaction; thus, the compensation required increases as the level of 
protection increases. The range of landowner preferences will be reflected in 
the condition prices of the owners. Assuming that landowner one strongly 
prefers conservation while landowner two weakly prefers conservation, 
landowner two will require greater payments for each acre conserved than 
landowner one, MWTA2(a) > MWTA1(a). 
 
Figure 2: Hypothetical Landowners 
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While protected lands provide a broad range of benefits, there are also 
associated opportunity costs. The opportunity cost of encumbering land with a 
conservation easement is the difference between the value of land in its highest 
private use and its restricted conservation value. If public funds are used to 
finance land conservation, society must consider other forgone publicly 
provided services in addition to the private goods and services foregone. If the 
costs of conservation-easement acquisitions are borne by a government 
program, public costs will extend beyond compensation to include program 
administration, income, capital, and sales taxes. MC is the summation of the 
condition prices, MWTA, across the i = 1. . .n landowners in the region in which 
land conservation is to take place, MC = i MWTAi. MC represents the 
opportunity cost of conserving an additional acre of land. The positively sloped 
MC curve reflects the increasing opportunity cost to society for land 
preservation. As the level of protected land grows, an ever-increasing amount 
of goods and services derived from developing land must be relinquished. This 
essential outline enables the investigation of results for different pricing 
strategies with a straightforward numerical and graphical approach. 
B. Single-Price Strategy 
Assume that both landowners in our example own 15,000 acres of land. Let 
mc1 = a1 represent the marginal cost (MC) for the landowner with strong 
conservation preferences while mc2 = a2 represents the landowner with weak 
conservation preferences, where  > . Society benefits from land preservation, 
but must also recognize the opportunity costs of such actions. By bringing 
together MB and MC discussed above, the optimal level of protection, A*, can 
be determined. To maximize welfare, land should be protected until the social 
benefit of conserving an additional acre of land is equal to the social cost of 
conserving an additional acre of land, MB = MC. The result is the socially 
efficient level of conservation A* = 20,000 acres.39 For any level of preservation 
less than 20,000 acres, the MB to society for preserving an additional acre of 
land exceeds the incremental cost of preserving an additional acre of land. As 
long as the net benefit of protecting an acre is positive, society can improve its 
welfare by increasing the level of conservation. Similarly, for any level of 
protection greater than 20,000 acres the cost of conserving an additional acre 
exceeds the incremental benefit of conserving an additional acre of land. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39. See Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Socially Efficient Level of Conserved Lands 
 
Minimizing the cost of protecting the optimal 20,000 acres requires the 
equalization of MWTA across landowners, or MB(A*) = MC(A*) = mwt(a2*) 
= mwt(a1*). As long as the MWTA across the landowners differ from one 
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acres of land. 
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about the landowner’s preferences for conservation exists, then the cost of 
conserving the optimal acreage could be reduced by offering a different price 
for each acre of land conserved in such a way that the price offered for each 
acre is equal to the MWTA for that unit. Figure 4 depicts the MWTA for 
landowner i. Landowner i is willing to accept as little as P1 for the first acre 
conserved, the fact that she is compensated P* per acre is a bonus or surplus of 
P*-P1. 
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Figure 4: Minimum Willingness to Accept for Landowner 
Lands Protected 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000
$ 
pe
r a
cr
e
Landowner Conservation Preference (acres)
a*1         2 â
MWTAᵢ
a
0
P
P*
P₂
P₁
E
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000
$ 
pe
r a
cr
e
Acres of Land Protected 
A*
MC
A
P*
P
MB
5 GUSTANSKI & WRIGHT_PAGINATED&WRIGHT 10/6/2011  
126 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 74:109 
Expand the argument to successive acres of protected land. The surplus of 
conserving a* acres of land is the surplus equal to the area below the optimal 
price, P*, and the area above the MWTA curve. This is the difference between 
the total MWTA for a* acres of land conserved in the trapezoid region of 0Ea*, 
the amount of compensation actually paid, 0P*Ea*. Figure 5 illustrates the 
surplus for both landowners. Note that the landowner with strong conservation 
preferences receives greater surplus for the transaction. Thirty-thousand dollars 
of the $60,000 that landowner two receives for conserving 6,000 acres is surplus, 
while landowner one benefits from $140,000 of surplus for conserving 14,000 
acres. Thus, if an agency or land trust is perfectly informed of the preferences of 
the landowners then it can reduce the cost of preservation by extracting the 
entire surplus from each landowner. 
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Figure 5: Conservation Landowner Surplus 
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Remember that the condition for optimal conservation requires that 
payments for each additional acre of land protected must be compared across 
landowners due to the existence of differing preferences for protected lands. 
Without being restricted to a one-price compensation strategy, the conservation 
program can benefit from the fact that landowners receiving a higher marginal 
benefit for conservation for the same level of conservation than those with a 
lower preference, and the compensation required for landowner one (type-one 
landowners) is lower than the compensation required for landowner two (type-
two landowners), MWTA2(a) > MWTA1(a). The conservation program will, at 
first, elect to acquire conservation easements from the landowner with the 
lowest WTA price, or type-one landowners. With the incremental price increase 
for each additional acre placed under conservation easement, payments 
required by type-one landowners may exceed the compensation needed by 
those landowners with a stronger preference for development, or type-two 
landowners. Strategically, the program should opt to place conservation 
easements on lands in designated areas owned by those with the lowest WTA 
until the compensation for conservation is equated across landowners and (A*) 
welfare-maximizing conservation is achieved. If payments are not equalized to 
achieve the optimum level of protected lands, then greater efficiency will occur 
by acquiring easements from landowners with lower WTA price, which, in 
practice, is frequently below the appraised fair market value (FMV) than from 
those landowners with a higher WTA price. As type-one landowners require 
less compensation for the same quantity of conservation than type-two 
landowners, type one will protect more land, a1* > a2*. Similarly, type-two 
landowners will develop more land relative to type-one landowners, â-a2* > â-
a1*. If programs function with perfect information and can price discriminate 
absolutely, each landowner will receive the minimum aggregate WTA for their 
conservation contributions: landowner two receives payment of $30,000 for 
6,000 acres placed under conservation easement, landowner one receives 
payment of $70,000 for 14,000 acres of conservation, neither receives any 
surplus, and maximum allocative efficiency is achieved. In this scenario, the cost 
of protecting the optimal acreage is reduced to $100,000 due to the fact that 
each individual is offered the minimum payment required to participate in the 
conservation-easement program. 
D. Asymmetric Preferences and Imperfect Information 
Finally, assume that the conservation program has accounted for different 
landowner preferences for conservation, but cannot differentiate between them. 
Again, using landowners one and two, the program offers the following options: 
Plan A: $30,000 for 6,000 acres. 
Plan B: $70,000 for 14,000 acres. 
The outcome is that both types of landowners would elect Plan A, which 
protects 12,000 net acres, or 8,000 fewer net acres than the optimal level. 
Landowner two will choose Plan A, as in the case of a perfectly informed 
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program agency, because the per-acre payment under Plan B is below the 
minimum WTA per acre for landowner two. Landowner two requires at least 
$140,000 to preserve 14,000 acres. Although landowner one has a stronger 
preference for conservation, landowner one would also choose Plan A, which 
provides less total compensation and protects fewer acres, because Plan B 
yields zero surplus while Plan A yields a surplus of $15,000, shown by the 
shaded area of Figure 6. 
To encourage landowner one to protect the optimal 14,000 acres, the agency 
will have to forfeit efficiency and tender an incentive-compatible plan that 
yields at least $15,000 of surplus to landowner one. The new options with 
compatible participation and incentive constraints are: 
Plan A: $30,000 for 6,000 acres. 
Plan B: $85,001 for 16,000 acres. 
With the program incentives modified, type-two landowners will again select 
Plan A as the price per acre because Plan B is below the minimum WTA per 
acre. However, type-one landowners will now select Plan B. Landowner one is 
willing to protect 14,000 acres for as little as $70,000, but Plan B offers a surplus 
of $15,001, which is greater than the surplus generated by Plan A. Thus, the 
optimal 20,000 acres is protected through the conservation-easement program 
for a total of $115,001. 
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Figure 6: Compensation Price Per Acre  
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Landowner Two 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000
$ 
pe
r a
cr
e
Acres of Land Protected (in '000s) 
6
$
10
Plan B
14
MWTA1 
$15,000
surplus
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000
$ 
pe
r a
cr
e
Acres of Land Protected (in '000s) 
20
$
10
MWTA2 
6 14
Plan A
5 GUSTANSKI & WRIGHT_PAGINATED&WRIGHT 10/6/2011  
Fall 2011] EXPLORING NET BENEFIT MAXIMIZATION 131 
E. Summary 
Knowing that landowners can be generally categorized by either having 
strong- or weak- preferences for conservation is important. Given that the social 
benefit of conservation exceeds the private benefit of development for each 
individual landowner, it is preferable to have both types of landowners 
participate in the land-conservation market. Numerous pricing options exist for 
conservation agencies to realize the goal of optimal protected acres. However, 
the preference is to offer lower compensation to individuals that obtain greater 
satisfaction for remaining on the land in its protected state. 
With full information, payments can be scaled so that landowners with 
comparatively strong preferences for land saving protect more and are paid less 
per acre protected than those landowners who receive less satisfaction for 
conservation. Because both categories of landowners receive benefits from 
protecting the land, below-market-value payments can be offered to each. 
Proper functioning of these principles requires an understanding, by the land 
trust or agency, as to where the preferences of landowners interested in 
participating in the conservation-easement marketplace lay. Without this 
knowledge, all participants will seek to collect maximum compensation, as 
evidenced by numerous program payments made by many public and private 
programs over the past several decades. To influence landowners to freely elect 
the payment and land-conservation blend that will provide both net benefit to 
the landowner and maximum net public benefit, payment for land-saving 
actions to those landowners with stronger preference for conserving the land 
(landowner type one) must be made more attractive relative to the 
compensation offered with full information. Fundamentally, the more perfect 
information land trusts and agency programs have regarding the pool of 
interested landowners, the greater the success of their respective efforts will be 
in strategically protecting the optimal amount of desired lands with the greatest 
economic efficiency. 
V 
CASE STUDIES 
The theoretical arguments in the preceding sections are explored through an 
examination of the following case studies. Each highlights the array of social, 
environmental, and economic values within landscape-scale conservation along 
a gradient of development pressure. These case studies reveal that conservation 
decision-making may be analyzed as dichotomous—with type-one landowners 
willing to accept relatively low MWTA (low condition price per acre) for 
conservation, and with type-two landowners who demand relatively high 
MWTA compensation. However, conservation-easement deals also occur 
within vernacular cultural settings where emotional bonds act as a driver of 
decision-making in ways that remain beyond our current ability to quantify and 
predict. 
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A. Malpai Borderlands, New Mexico, and Arizona 
The “Bootheel” region of southwest New Mexico and adjacent Arizona is a 
remote and biologically diverse ranching landscape that is only beginning to 
experience subdivision activity. Despite this, it is the location of one of the most 
innovative and effective conservation easement and land-stewardship efforts in 
the country.40 
The Malpai—“badlands” in Spanish—is a broad expanse of desert basins 
and rugged mountain ranges of the Bootheel region bordering Mexico that is 
famed for its extraordinary biodiversity.41 Flora and fauna from the Sierra 
Madre, Chihuahuan, and Sonoran Basin and Range ecoregions merge across a 
complex mosaic of privately owned ranches and government lands. Twenty 
species are federally threatened or endangered including the jaguar, ocelot, 
Mexican wolf, jaguaramundi, coatimundi, thick-billed parrot, Mexican spotted 
owl, aplomado and peregrine falcon, bald eagle, long-nosed bat, Yaqui chub, 
Yaqui topminnow, and Beautiful shiner.42 The Malpai has the greatest reptile 
and amphibian diversity in North America. The desert tortoise reaches its 
extreme eastern distribution in the region. The endangered Chiricahua leopard 
frog resides in wetlands. The New Mexico ridge-nosed rattlesnake is found only 
in the wooded mountain canyons of the Malpai. 
Development pressure is slight on the forty-one percent of the region that is 
privately held. Hidalgo County, New Mexico is larger than Delaware, but with 
only 5,932 residents it has a low population density with less than two people 
per square mile.43 Adjacent Cochise County, Arizona is larger than Connecticut 
with less than 5,000 of its 129,000 residents living in the Malpai area. The 
average ranch in the region contains 8,000 acres of fee simple land with 40,000 
acres leased from a state, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), or U.S. 
Forest Service (USFS). Land values average $100 per acre for large working 
ranches.44 
In 1990, The Nature Conservancy (TNC) purchased the 321,000 acre (502 
square miles) Gray Ranch for $18 million (fifty-six dollars per acre).45 The 
seller, a type-one landowner, wished to see the property conserved and 
accepted a relatively low per acre appraised value relative to what a more 
 
 40. See generally NATHAN F. SAYRE, WORKING WILDERNESS: THE MALPAI BORDERLANDS 
GROUP AND THE FUTURE OF THE WESTERN RANGE (2005). 
 41. See U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., FOREST SERVICE, GENERAL TECHNICAL REPORT RM-GTR-264, 
BIODIVERSITY AND MANAGEMENT OF THE MADREAN ARCHIPELAGO: THE SKY ISLANDS OF 
SOUTHWESTERN UNITED STATES AND NORTHWESTERN MEXICO (1995). 
 42. James H. Brown & Astrid Kodric-Brown, Biodiversity on the Borderlands, NAT. HIST., Apr. 
1996, at 58. 
 43. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NEW MEXICO: 2000 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
2002pubs/c2kprof00-nm.pdf. 
 44. Thomas L. Daniels & John B. Wright, Internal Report to the National Fish and Wildlife 
Foundation Evaluating the Organization’s Land Conservation Projects from 1980–2008 (Nat’l Fish & 
Wildlife Found., Internal Report 2008). 
 45. SAYRE, supra note 40, at 51. 
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development-oriented landowner would have demanded. Yet, TNC had no 
plans to keep the biotically vital ranch and wished to transfer it to the federal 
government to become a vast national wildlife refuge where cattle would be 
removed. The Gray Ranch acquisition stirred concern among working ranchers. 
In 1994, they created the Malpai Borderlands Group (MBG), which has a 
mission “to restore and maintain the natural processes that create and protect a 
healthy, unfragmented landscape to support a diverse, flourishing community of 
human, plant, and animal life in our borderlands region.”46 Drum Hadley and 
other ranchers saw cattle as fully compatible with wildlife, and private land as 
superior to public. Their vision was a working wilderness.47 
In 1994, after years of negotiations, the newly created Animas Foundation 
and Drum Hadley bought the Gray Ranch for $13.2 million with the property 
placed under a conservation easement held by TNC.48 The easement capture 
was $4.8 million or twenty-seven percent of the $18 million appraised value of 
the unrestricted property. The easement barred development for 
nonagricultural purposes across the entire 502 square miles. Sensitive, high-
elevation ranges were made off limits to grazing, but valley grasslands remained 
open to ranching. The easement was designed as two tiers that reflected two 
philosophies of conservation: biodiversity preservation in the mountains and 
working ranch land in the valley. In reality, species migration renders the entire 
property a functional ecosystem. However, this two-tiered approach proved to 
be the tipping point for local acceptance of easements since the best ranch land 
would remain in cattle production. 
Since 1994, the MBG has embraced conservation easements as a technique 
to keep working lands intact. The organization has been involved in twelve 
conservation easements protecting over 75,000 acres.49 Eight of the easements 
were purchased using funds from the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation 
(NFWF) and other donors. Four were obtained by trading ranchers’ access to 
grazing on the Gray Ranch (currently the Diamond A Ranch) in exchange for 
placing conservation easements on their property. This innovative 
“grassbanking” program not only prevents development, but it allows ranchers 
to rest their home places during droughts or following fires to control shrub 
encroachment.50 The amount of a ranch placed under easement is calculated 
using the appraised value of the grazing rights provided under the grassbank 
 
 46. MALPAI BORDERLANDS GRP., http://www.malpaiborderlandsgroup.org (last visited Mar. 20, 
2011). 
 47. See Drummond Hadley, The Origin and Future of the Grassbank, in WRITERS ON THE RANGE 
183 (Karl Hess, Jr. & John A. Baden eds., 1998). See also Arriagada & Perrings, supra note 26; 
Gustanski et al., supra note 31. 
 48. SAYRE, supra note 40, at 64. 
 49. Bill McDonald, Conservation Easements and the Malpai Borderlands Group, MALPAI 
BORDERLANDS GRP., http://malpaiborderlandsgroup.org/ce.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2011); About, 
MALPAI BORDERLANDS GRP., http://malpaiborderlandsgroup.org/about.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 
2011). 
 50. See generally Hadley, supra note 47. 
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contract and the appraised value of the ranch per acre. Grass is used as payment 
for easements instead of cash. 
All MBG easements prohibit subdivision and development in perpetuity. 
All ranching uses are permitted and the MBG has no input into management. 
Instead, the MBG works collaboratively with ranchers who voluntarily choose 
to restore native grasslands and savannas, conduct prescribed burns, replace old 
barb fences with wildlife-friendly fences, and build ecologically compatible 
water-catchment structures.51 The MBG raises funds to help pay for this work. 
However, unlike tax-deductible donated easements, MBG deeds contain 
language which allows termination of the easement should a government 
agency rescind or severely restrict existing grazing permits on public land, which 
are necessary for ranches to remain economically viable. Malpai easements also 
allow landowners to terminate the easement if the MBG ceases to exist. This is 
to assure landowners that the MBG was not a mechanism for the eventual 
transfer of easements to a public agency. While these culturally based 
arrangements may be seen as “loopholes,” the NFWF and other donors who 
paid for the easements remain strongly supportive of the program. MBG 
easements typically cost about thirty dollars per acre—a spectacular deal given 
the immense biodiversity present.52 In this case study, easement sellers would be 
classified as type-one landowners under our model since they accepted a 
relatively low condition price. Emotional connection to the land acted as a 
supplementary compensation. Since federal tax deductions were not used, 
termination can legally occur without the involvement of courts or the Treasury 
Department. This reveals the essential difference between MBG easements that 
are primarily designed to support ranching, and typical donated easements that 
emphasize ecological and open-space resources. The low cost, simplicity, and 
massive net conservation benefits of these easements overshadow the low risk 
of termination. In essence, the ranchers of the Malpai region are held in good 
faith by conservation funders. These basic easements might also be seen as a 
first step toward more restrictive amendments in future decades as the 
properties change hands. 
The MBG, Diamond A Ranch (formerly Gray Ranch), and New Mexico 
Land Conservancy (NMLC) (a statewide land trust) easements together protect 
some 400,000 acres (625 square miles) of ecologically diverse and beautiful 
working lands. While nearly all easement properties emphasize grazing, one 
project does not. The 1,760 acre Bioresearch Ranch, just south of the Diamond 
A Ranch, is under an easement held by the NMLC using funds from the 
NFWF.53 Cattle have not been grazed on the property since 1973. Desert 
bighorn, jaguar, rare Coues whitetail deer, collared peccary, and dozens of 
 
 51. See generally Charles G. Curtin, Integration of Science and Community-Based Conservation in 
the Mexico/U.S. Borderlands, 16 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 880 (2002). 
 52. Daniels & Wright, supra note 44. 
 53. Bioresearch Ranch, N.M. LAND CONSERVANCY, http://www.nmlandconservancy.org/Projects/ 
ProjectsBioResearchRanch_P1_19.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2011). 
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other species of concern are found on the site. Although this project does not 
meet the mission of the MBG, it supports the project; a testament to the local 
tradition of private-property rights and mutual respect. 
The ongoing success of conservation efforts in the Malpai region is driven by 
a confluence of nature, creative finance, and the landowners’ topophilia—love 
of place. Conservation easement costs remain low and the benefits continue to 
increase as adjacent landscapes in Arizona and New Mexico are consumed by 
development. In our model, the marginal benefit (MB) of conserving additional 
acres does not raise per-acre acquisition costs because landowners are willing to 
sell easements for relatively low prices across their entire properties. Easement 
sellers in the Malpai region are classic type-one landowners with a strong 
conservation ethic. This case study reminds us that easements can be effectively 
used long before development pressure raises their purchase price or tax cost. 
Conservation easements are best seen as de jure–vernacular statements of 
stewardship that are rewarded with some level of financial compensation. These 
contracts are as much about personal ethics as economics. 
B. Blackfoot River Valley, Montana 
The Blackfoot River is best known as the setting for Norman MacLean’s 
novella A River Runs Through It and the film by that same name. It is more 
praiseworthy for the 110,000 acres of conservation easements and collaborative 
land-stewardship efforts anchored by a coalition of landowners, agencies, and 
nonprofits known as the Blackfoot Challenge.54 
The 1.5 million acre Blackfoot River watershed is the scene of moderate 
subdivision pressure and a long history of conflicts over logging and mining.55 
The drainage provides habitat for 236 species of birds, fifty species of mammals, 
five species of amphibians, and four species of reptiles. The federally 
endangered gray wolf lives in packs across the drainage. Threatened bald 
eagles, grizzly bears, and Canada lynx are well represented; elk herds are 
immense and wolverines hunt in high mountain forests. The 132 mile, free-
flowing Blackfoot River supports twenty-five species of fish with twelve natives 
such as the rainbow trout, brown trout, federally threatened bull trout, and rare 
Westslope cutthroat trout. The high biodiversity of the watershed makes it a 
vital part of the “Crown of the Continent Ecosystem” linking the Blackfoot 
Valley with the Scapegoat, Bob Marshall, and Great Bear wilderness areas; 
Glacier National Park; and the vast, wild Canadian landscapes of Banff, Jasper, 
and the Yukon.56 
 
 54. BLACKFOOT CHALLENGE, http://www.blackfootchallenge.org (last visited Mar. 21, 2011). 
 55. See generally JOHN B. WRIGHT, MONTANA GHOST DANCE: ESSAYS ON LAND AND LIFE 
(1998). 
 56. See generally Welcome to the Crown of the Continent Ecosystem, THE CROWN OF THE 
CONTINENT ECOSYSTEM EDUC. CONSORTIUM, http://www.crownofthecontinent.org/coceec.htm (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2011). 
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In the late 1960s, the first recreational subdivisions were platted in the 
Blackfoot River Valley with little land-use planning oversight except permits 
for septic-tank systems. The specter of increasing, uncontrolled development 
aroused concern among residents of the valley. The landscape was already 
impacted by the clear cutting of fir and pine forests on U.S. Forest Service and 
Champion International land, leakage of toxins from mines, weed 
encroachment, and rising recreational demand by hunters and river floaters.57 
Landowners who were considering “Wild and Scenic River” status for the 
Blackfoot balked at the idea of federal land-use regulations in the valley. 
County zoning and other restrictions were viewed as bureaucratic and 
ineffective. In the end, conservation easements were seen as the most practical 
way of protecting the land while respecting private-property rights. 
In the 1970s, subdivisions were platted at an increasing pace across the 
watershed. Most divisions were created using exemptions in the Montana 
Subdivision and Platting Act that allowed twenty-acre parcels “occasional 
sales”58—one parcel per year, and family transfers to be surveyed and sold with 
no planning board review.59 In response, the first conservation easement was 
completed by TNC in 1976 on a small ranch beside the Blackfoot River.60 The 
320 acre 5 Star Double R Ranch came next—a lightly grazed place full of 
osprey and great blue herons. Local skepticism about easements diminished 
when the 3,656 acre Monture Hereford Ranch was protected. This project 
demonstrated that conservation easements were fully compatible with 
traditional cattle ranching and the protection of rare species; in this case, a plant 
called Howell’s gumweed. Land Lindbergh then donated easements protecting 
763 acres on both sides of the Blackfoot River. He said simply, “We were just 
trying to adjust to the changes that were coming. The whole valley is worth 
saving, so that’s what we decided to try.”61 Valuation questions and financial 
benefits were seldom the primary reasons landowners chose to conserve their 
property.62 Federal tax incentives for easement donations were modest at that 
time compared with the market value of land for development. Land ethics and 
a profound sense of place were the principal reasons for conservation-easement 
conveyances. Easement donors in this case study were classic type-one 
landowners where emotional conservation benefits trumped high economic 
compensation. 
In 1993, landowners in the Blackfoot River Valley founded the Blackfoot 
Challenge to coordinate not just conservation easements, but a full range of 
 
 57. John B. Wright, The Real River That Runs Through It: Montana’s Imperiled Blackfoot, FOCUS 
ON GEOGRAPHY, Spring 1993, at 18. 
 58. MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (2010). 
 59. WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 39. 
 60. WRIGHT, supra note 55, at 115. 
 61. Id. at 116. 
 62. John B. Wright, Conservation Easements: An Analysis of Donated Development Rights, 59 J. 
AM. PLANNING ASS’N. 487, 491 (1993). 
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issues including cattle grazing, timber management, stream restoration, weed 
control, hunting, road building, and snowmobiles. 
In 2001, the Blackfoot Challenge rallied support for a plan to buy 88,000 
acres of Plum Creek corporate timber land to keep it from being subdivided for 
recreational home sites. TNC agreed to purchase the property and resell it, 
subject to conservation easements, to local ranchers and public agencies who 
would manage the land for sustainable timber harvest, grazing, recreation, and 
wildlife. To date, some 47,000 acres have been acquired by TNC with the 
remainder in progress. The grand scale of this project reveals the power of the 
strategic and sequential use of fee-simple acquisitions, conservation easements, 
and conservation-buyer transactions. 
However, the Blackfoot Challenge also wished to acquire a portion of the 
former Plum Creek property as a community resource. In 2005, the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service bought a conservation easement from TNC on 5,609 acres 
that were the focus of local interest. This property was then transferred by TNC 
to the Blackfoot Challenge as the core of a 41,000 acre multiple-use 
demonstration area. This pilot initiative was a “proof of concept” exercise in 
cross-boundary ecosystem management. Other landowners in this 41,000 acre 
unit include the Lolo National Forest; Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, 
and Parks; Montana Department of Natural Resources; and private ranchers. 
The 5,609 acre property is now called the Blackfoot Community Conservation 
Area (BCCA), which is managed by a committee of the Blackfoot Challenge 
under a 2009 plan. The fifteen-member committee consists of agency 
representatives, private landowners, recreational user groups, and local business 
people or outfitters. The conservation easement prevents subdivision, 
commercial and industrial uses, excessive timber harvest, and mining. The 
actual stewardship of the land—its restoration and sustainable use—depends on 
the collaboration spearheaded by the Blackfoot Challenge. 
Today, some 110,000 acres and forty-seven miles of the Blackfoot River are 
under perpetual conservation easements.63 Easements are held by federal and 
state agencies and land trusts. The Montana Land Reliance (MLR) is a state-
wide land trust that holds donated conservation easements on nearly 821,000 
acres of prime ranchlands and wildlife habitats across Montana—the most of 
any local or statewide trust in the country.64 Some 42,000 of those acres are in 
the Blackfoot watershed. 
The cultural geography of the Blackfoot River Valley is shifting from 
“native Montanans” and long-term residents to amenity migrants seeking a 
fresh start in a conserved landscape. The existence of the conservation-
easement corridor along the Blackfoot River is having an array of effects. Land 
values for properties not under easement are rising despite a national recession. 
 
 63. Daniels & Wright, supra note 44. 
 64. Achievements, MONTANA LAND RELIANCE, http://www.mtlandreliance.org/achieve.htm (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2011). 
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The certainty of having perpetual open space next to a home site increases both 
demand and price. However, these market forces also raise the potential value 
of donated conservation easements on remaining unrestricted properties. The 
entrenched conservation tradition in the valley also exerts a strong pressure 
toward easement use. The Blackfoot River Valley is becoming an “intentional 
community” of people seeking a landscape to match their conservation 
ideology. The resale value of ranches under easement is not accurately known 
since most original owners are still in place. It seems probable that “eased” 
ranches will bring high prices that may not significantly reflect easement 
diminution, especially where surrounding properties are similarly protected. If 
this proves true, conserved corridors like the Blackfoot may bring even stronger 
IRS scrutiny of easement appraisals across the country.65 Appraisals are often 
faulty in appraising the “after” or conserved value of the property. If easements 
are shown not to significantly reduce short-term market prices for ranches, for 
example, additional incentives must be found to encourage easement donations 
or funds must be available to buy them outright. 
Conservation easements have a thirty-four-year history in the Blackfoot 
River Valley. The tool began as a novelty, grew opportunistically, and is now 
the centerpiece of a broad-based, collaborative conservation strategy. Prices 
accepted for conservation easements remain modest in most cases. The 
appraised value of an easement claimed as a federal and state tax deduction 
averages under fifty percent of fee-simple value. Until the expanded federal tax 
deduction rules took effect, incomes of most donors were not sufficient to take 
full advantage of charitable gifts.66 That has now changed and easement use in 
the Blackfoot Valley consists of both type-one and type-two landowners. 
Today, few people in the watershed are unaware of conservation easements, 
as most live within sight of one. Vocal opposition to easements is now the 
shrinking realm of the private-property-rights activists who fail to grasp that 
conservation easements are in fact a powerful expression of precisely that. 
Predicting future easement use remains difficult, but the confluence of 
widespread information, local experience, and an evolving culture of 
stewardship suggests even broader use of the tool in coming years. 
Conservation in the watershed is no longer an externality—the marketplace has 
internalized and monetized easements. 
C. New Mexico Land Conservancy Easements 
The preceding case studies explore easement valuation and use where land 
development pressure is low (Malpai Borderlands) and moderate (Blackfoot 
Valley). Several projects of the NMLC illustrate the financial and cultural 
 
 65. CATHERINE KESKE, THE EMERGING MARKET FOR PRIVATE LAND PRESERVATION AND 
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS (2008). See also Victoria L. McCollum & Bennett Thrasher, IRS Scrutiny 
of Charitable Conservation Easements, 35 TAX ADVISOR 603, 603–607 (2004). 
 66. The enhanced incentive is still in effect. Supra note 22. 
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complexities of completing easements where land development pressure is 
severe.67 
The Village of Corrales lies just northwest of Albuquerque, New Mexico. In 
1710, the King of Spain gave Francisco Montes Vigil the 100,000 acre Alameda 
Land Grant where Corrales emerged as a quiet farming community. By 2010, 
the Village of 7,300 residents became surrounded by residential development 
with land values exceeding $115,000 per acre for one- or two-acre tracts.68 
Corrales is an island of irrigated farmland and cottonwood bosques (riparian 
forests) in a booming metropolitan region of more than 700,000 people in the 
Rio Grande Valley. Land development pressure is among the highest in New 
Mexico with the Albuquerque Metro region averaging nearly two percent 
annual population gain—a doubling time of thirty-five years.69 
In 2003, the village passed a $5 million general obligation open-space bond 
to establish a PDR program to protect farmland. The NMLC was selected to 
hold the first four purchased conservation easements. Appraisals revealed 
easement values averaging $82,000 per acre—a staggering contrast to the thirty 
dollars per acre in the Malpai Borderlands. The properties contained scenic, 
open-space, agricultural, and historic values, but ecological importance was 
modest. About half the funds for easement purchases came from the Corrales 
open-space bond and half from the U.S. Department of Agriculture Farm and 
Ranchland Protection Program (FRPP). 
Conservation easements were purchased on twenty-eight acres at a cost of 
$2.3 million.70 That sum would protect more than 9,000 acres in the Malpai and 
3,400 acres in the Blackfoot Valley. The eighteen-acre Corrales Gateway 
easement is the largest in the village, part of an eighty-one-acre property known 
as the “Trees of Corrales.” The Gonzales farm easement protects six acres of 
pastures that have been owned by that family since 1712. The six-acre Ventana 
Grande property is used for alfalfa and hay production. Its ninety-one-year-old 
owner Dorothy Smith says of the project, “There’s no turning back when you 
turn farms into subdivisions.”71 The two-acre Kendall easement is used for 
viticulture as part of New Mexico’s rising wine industry. The Minge easement is 
a two-acre chili field adjacent to the historic Casa San Ysidro Museum and 
across the street from the San Ysidro Church. 
Corrales is both a positive story and cautionary tale. The village’s open-
space bond and farmland protection program are the first in New Mexico. 
 
 67. See, e.g., Corrales Gateway, N.M. LAND CONSERVANCY, http://www.nmlandconservancy.org/ 
Projects/ProjectsCorralesGateway_P1_4.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2011). 
 68. Material on land values retrieved from the website of Corrales Realty, http:// 
www.corralesrealty.com (last visited Nov. 18, 2010). 
 69. Michaela Buenemann & John B. Wright, Southwest Transformation: Eras of Land Change and 
Growth in Las Cruces, New Mexico, 14 SW. GEOGRAPHER (2010). 
 70. Our Conservation Easements, N.M. LAND CONSERVANCY, http://www.nmlandconservancy.org/ 
Projects/ConservationEasements_P01.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2010). 
 71. Ventana Grande, N.M. LAND CONSERVANCY, http://www.nmlandconservancy.org/Projects/ 
ProjectsVentanaGrande_P1_15.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2011). 
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However, since they came so late, the per-acre costs are extreme and the results 
are limited. Although high land values in other settings such as Jackson, 
Wyoming and the Madison Valley of Montana have stimulated scores of 
easement donations, this is not yet the case in Corrales.72 The difference appears 
to be income levels. Amenity ranches in the places mentioned are typically 
owned by extremely wealthy business and entertainment figures. Even 
multimillion-dollar easement tax deductions can be written off. In Corrales, the 
median household income is $67,217—wealthy by New Mexico standards—but 
many landowners fit the classic description of “land rich, cash poor.” Most 
landowners cannot afford to donate an easement or cover appraisal, baseline, 
land trust, or legal expenses. They are classic type-two landowners in our 
model—those who, for reasons of economic practicality, demand high condition 
prices to agree to an easement sale. The minimum payment per acre in Corrales 
is simply the appraised value of a land tract’s development rights—often more 
than seventy percent of its fee-simple price. Landowners were not willing to 
complete “bargain sale” easements at a below-appraised-value price: they 
wanted top dollar. As a result, easement purchase dollars do not go nearly far 
enough to achieve the community’s farmland-protection goals. Corrales 
illustrates the penalty of waiting to pursue easements until costs grow 
exorbitant. 
A solution might be found in “conservation development” designs.73 The 
NMLC holds easements of this type on over 35,000 acres in fast-growing regions 
of the state. The 8,500 acre Cougar Mountain Ranch project illustrates the 
design process.74 The property is about one hour southeast of Albuquerque in 
an area experiencing rapid and extensive subdivision activity targeted at both 
commuters and retirees. In 2005, the landowner, a conservation development 
company, sought to subdivide a portion of the ranch and donate a conservation 
easement over the areas of highest ecological, scenic, and agricultural 
importance. The baseline analysis showed (1) high scenic values adjacent to the 
Cibola National Forest; (2) agricultural and open-space importance in the 
grasslands and pinyon-juniper savannas; and (3) extensive wildlife use by elk, 
mule deer, black bear, mountain lion, pronghorn antelope, and golden eagle. 
The goals of the project were threefold: to maintain ranching use, to conserve 
the natural and scenic resources, and to generate income from the sale of lots to 
conservation buyers. The art of conservation development designs is in finding 
the right balance between conservation and monetary goals.75 
 
 72. STORY CLARK, A FIELD GUIDE TO CONSERVATION FINANCE (2007). 
 73. See generally ANTHONY ANELLA & JOHN B. WRIGHT, SAVING THE RANCH: CONSERVATION 
EASEMENT DESIGN IN THE AMERICAN WEST (2004); RANDALL G. ARENDT, CONSERVATION 
DESIGN FOR SUBDIVISIONS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CREATING OPEN SPACE NETWORKS (1996). 
 74. Cougar Mountain Ranch, N.M. LAND CONSERVANCY, http://www.nmlandconservancy.org/ 
Projects/ProjectsCougarMtnRanch_P1_3.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2010). 
 75. John B. Wright, Designing and Applying Conservation Easements, 60 J. AM. PLANNING ASS’N 
380 (1994). 
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The master planning process identified 6,200 acres for conservation—placed 
under an easement donated to the NMLC—and 2,300 acres for development, 
subdivided into fifty forty-acre residential lots with deed restrictions prohibiting 
future splits. Lots were clustered around the margins of the easement to avoid 
fragmentation. The easement appraisal determined the “enhancement” of lot 
values adjacent to perpetual open space, which is a critical consideration in 
conservation-development calculations. Failure to do so may result in an IRS 
audit and substantial penalties for not considering private inurement, 
compensation of private interests over public benefit, which would reduce the 
value of a conservation-easement donation. Lot buyers are granted recreational 
access to the conservation area for hiking, biking, and horseback riding—a core 
element of the marketing strategy. General public access remains on a 
permission basis. An eleven-acre “building envelope” was retained at the ranch 
headquarters where agricultural buildings and a small dude-ranch lodge can be 
built. A nine-acre building envelope was created near a road where one new 
residence is allowed. These hold backs were also factored into the easement 
appraisal.  
The Cougar Mountain Ranch project is now complete. All lots are sold and 
the easement has been in force for five years with no violations. The same 
conservation real-estate company has completed similar projects at the Deer 
Canyon Preserve, Lake Valley Ranch, and Berrenda Creek Ranch in other 
rapidly growing areas of New Mexico. Conservation real-estate companies are 
classic type-two landowners in our model. For them, easements may support 
their personal ethics to some degree, but the tool is essentially a part of doing 
business in a more competitive manner. Although a quality easement design 
can make a development more marketable, realtors typically require relatively 
high compensation for conservation easements. 
D. Summary 
The preceding case studies illustrate conservation easement use along a 
gradient of development pressure in the West. Easements can be successfully 
applied wherever and whenever attempted, provided landowners feel at least 
some sense of stewardship. However, the tool is least expensive in places that 
are just beginning to experience growth and development. The Malpai 
Borderlands demonstrate that it is possible to conserve an entire landscape if 
stakeholders anticipate future development and work collaboratively to attract 
needed financial resources. The Blackfoot River Valley shows that easements 
can keep a land base intact in the face of moderate development pressure and 
serve as the foundation for a collaborative effort to restore and live sensibly on 
what locals call “good ground.” The NMLC case studies reveal the high costs 
and greater intricacies of completing conservation easements in fast-growing 
places. 
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In all settings, easement success depends on the presence of people who 
care deeply about the land.76 Despite the complexities of negotiations, arcane 
tax and finance issues, theory, and a shifting political stage, land saving remains 
a cultural matter.77 The land-stewardship values of ranchers, ecologists, and 
certain developers are often the essential drivers of conservation-easement use 
in the American West. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
While it is difficult to account for all ecosystem-service values in our market-
based economy, conservation easements present a dynamic and flexible 
approach to guarding these important assets for the future. Today, there are 
several widely accepted economic-valuation methodologies to enable the 
integration of ecosystem-service values (natural capital) into the current 
conservation-easement-appraisal process. Doing so would, in part, help to 
resolve some of the long-standing issues presented here. If, however, there is 
political reluctance to evaluate and prescribe modifications to the existing 
appraisal system, other incentive-based possibilities, such as ecosystem-service 
markets,78 may be necessary to help assure that the net value of conservation 
easements are maximized at the public–private interface. Incentive programs 
designed to provide financial and technical assistance to landowners who 
employ specified management practices or pay landowners for the 
environmental benefits they produce, are two examples. Development of such 
programs in cooperation with coordinated strategic public and private 
conservation-easement programs will both require markets to recognize the 
true value of the array of public benefits provided by conserved lands and foster 
net value maximization at the landscape scale. 
The question remains: Will the conservation-easement market, without 
intercession to better quantify and align economic values associated with the 
social benefits provided by protected lands, ever ascend to the rank of a 
complete market? The conclusion drawn from both theory and praxis is that 
different forms of public and private intervention in coordination will make it 
more likely. Generally, efforts to intercede should target maximizing the net 
value of conservation easements by facilitating more transactions in strategic 
areas, reducing transaction costs, and attuning price signals for greater 
consistency. Several indications from the field point toward advances in the 
market for private-land conservation, so the opportunity costs of waiting out 
potential self correction are high. Economic factors play a role in the valuing of 
 
 76. See generally RICHARD BREWER, CONSERVANCY: THE LAND TRUST MOVEMENT IN 
AMERICA (2003). 
 77. WRIGHT, supra note, at 17. 
 78. See generally Jeffrey D. Kline et al., Toward a Rational Exuberance for Ecosystem Services 
Markets, 107 J. FORESTRY 204 (2009). 
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conservation as do unique land factors, people, conservation organizations, 
communities, land managers, and policy makers. Yet, a push is needed to move 
the market to greater efficiency, by expansion of breadth and reach, most likely 
from cultural geography—the people—of the landscapes in question. Ethical 
and economic values are now coalescing in myriad ways within the emerging 
conservation-easement marketplace. 
 
